Independent assurance report

FIND A SOLUTION AT Academic Writers Bay

Independent assurance report to Parliament
2020–21: 5
Follow up of
Managing the Level
Crossing Removal
Program
October 2020
This report is printed on Monza Recycled paper. Monza Recycled is certified Carbon Neutral by The Carbon
Reduction Institute (CRI) in accordance with the global Greenhouse Gas Protocol and ISO 14040 framework. The
Lifecycle Analysis for Monza Recycled is cradle to grave including Scopes 1, 2 and 3. It has FSC Mix Certification
combined with 99% recycled content.
ISBN 978-1-925678-81-9
Follow up of Managing
the Level Crossing
Removal Program
Independent assurance report to Parliament
Ordered to be published
VICTORIAN GOVERNMENT PRINTER
October 2020
PP no 173, Session 2018–20
Follow up of Managing the Level Crossing Removal Program | Victorian Auditor-General´s Report
The Victorian Auditor-General’s Office acknowledges Australian Aboriginal peoples as the
traditional custodians of the land throughout Victoria. We pay our respect to all Aboriginal
communities, their continuing culture and to Elders past, present and emerging.
The Hon Nazih Elasmar MLC The Hon Colin Brooks MP
President Speaker
Legislative Council Legislative Assembly
Parliament House Parliament House
Melbourne Melbourne
Dear Presiding Officers
Under the provisions of the Audit Act 1994, I transmit my report Follow up of Managing the Level
Crossing Removal Program.
Yours faithfully
Andrew Greaves
Auditor-General
14 October 2020
Contents
Follow up of Managing the Level Crossing Removal Program | Victorian Auditor-General´s Report
Audit snapshot ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 1
1. Audit context ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 4
1.1 Risks posed by level crossings ………………………………………………………………………………………… 5
1.2 The LXRP’s evolution …………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 5
1.3 Changes to government agencies since our 2017 audit ………………………………………….. 6
1.4 Project delivery ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 7
1.5 Options for removing level crossings ……………………………………………………………………………. 8
1.6 Applying the HVHR framework ……………………………………………………………………………………. 10
2. Developing LXRP2 …………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 11
2.1 LXRA’s site selection process for LXRP2 …………………………………………………………………….. 12
2.2 Business case and advice to government………………………………………………………………….. 20
2.3 Assessing options for removing level crossings ………………………………………………………. 22
3. Procurement and packaging………………………………………………………………………………….. 24
3.1 MTIA’s procurement approach for LXRP2 …………………………………………………………………. 25
3.2 Packaging sites for removal ………………………………………………………………………………………….. 26
3.3 Benchmarking and minimising costs ………………………………………………………………………….. 28
4. Managing benefits …………………………………………………………………………………………………….31
4.1 KPIs for level crossing removal sites …………………………………………………………………………… 32
4.2 How MTIA monitors the project’s outcomes ……………………………………………………………. 34
5. Network integrity and standards governance ……………………………………………………. 38
5.1 Network integrity controls …………………………………………………………………………………………….. 39
5.2 Network standards ………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 40
APPENDIX A. Submissions and comments …………………………………………………………………… 44
APPENDIX B. Acronyms, abbreviations and glossary …………………………………………………. 47
APPENDIX C. Scope of this audit …………………………………………………………………………………….. 49
APPENDIX D. LXRP sites ……………………………………………………………………………………………………..51
APPENDIX E. LXRP benefits management plan …………………………………………………………… 54
APPENDIX F. LXRP works packages ……………………………………………………………………………….. 56
1 | Follow up of Managing the Level Crossing Removal Program | Victorian Auditor-General´s Report
Audit snapshot
Have the Department of Transport and the Major Transport Infrastructure Authority
effectively addressed recommendations made in our 2017 audit Managing the Level
Crossing Removal Program?
Why this audit is important
Our 2017 audit identified
weaknesses in the Level Crossing
Removal Project’s (LXRP) design
and delivery.
In 2018, the Victorian Government
expanded the LXRP from 50 to
75 sites, which increased the
project’s total estimated cost from
$8 billion to $14.8 billion.
It is vital that agencies implement
lessons learnt from the first stage of
the project to improve the second
stage’s delivery and value for
money.
Who we examined
 Department of Transport (DoT)
 Major Transport Infrastructure
Authority (MTIA).
What we examined
Whether agencies addressed our
2017 recommendations (six for DoT
and four for MTIA).
What we concluded
DoT and MTIA have fully addressed
seven recommendations. DoT has
partially addressed one and is still
addressing a further two.
Unlike the process used to select
the first 50 level crossing removal
sites, DoT and MTIA used a
transparent selection process for
stage two (LXRP2). They fairly
balanced the principles of safety,
congestion and delivery efficiency.
Consequently, LXRP2 is on track to
meet the project’s overall aim of
removing dangerous and
congested level crossings.
DoT and MTIA have also improved
how they measure the project’s
benefits and reviewed their
procurement approach to ensure it
minimises costs.
However, DoT and MTIA did not
complete a full business case for
LXRP2. As a result, the government
did not receive advice about the
project’s expected economic
benefit before it made its decision
to fund LXRP2.
DoT is also yet to complete work on
engineering standards and network
integrity controls. This creates a risk
that project delivery agencies and
contractors may be unsure about
the technical standards their
projects need to meet to integrate
with the transport network.
Key facts
2 | Follow up of Managing the Level Crossing Removal Program | Victorian Auditor-General´s Report
What we found
We consulted with the audited agencies and considered their
views when reaching our conclusions. The agencies’ full responses
are in Appendix A.
Summary of progress and outcomes
The table on the next page summarises DoT’s and MTIA’s progress on each of our
2017 recommendations. Appendix C contains the full list of recommendations from
our 2017 audit.
Of the 10 recommendations:
 seven have been fully implemented
 one has been partially addressed, with no further work planned
 two are still in progress and further work is needed to ensure that the underlying
issues are addressed.
There is a detailed assessment of each recommendation throughout the report.
3 | Follow up of Managing the Level Crossing Removal Program | Victorian Auditor-General´s Report
Agencies’ progress on addressing our 2017 recommendations
No. Issue Status and comments
Developing LXRP2
2 Site selection process
Addressed
MTIA used a comprehensive and transparent site prioritisation framework to select the LXRP2
sites.
1 Business case
Partially addressed
DoT and MTIA have completed some of the High Value High Risk (HVHR) framework’s
requirements. However, they did not prepare a business case or cost-benefit analysis for
LXRP2.
7 Options assessment
Addressed
Unlike the process for stage one of the Level Crossing Removal Project (LXRP1), which varied
for different sites, MTIA is now using a consistent and transparent process to select grade
separation options.
Procurement and packaging
8 Evaluation of contract
structure
Addressed
While there has not been a formal independent evaluation of deferred price contracting, MTIA
and the Office of Projects Victoria (OPV) have reviewed its benefits.
10 Packaging approach
Addressed
While MTIA did not commission a formal evaluation of its packaging approach, it has
incorporated lessons learnt into its packaging approach for LXRP2.
9 Benchmarking tool
Addressed
MTIA’s benchmarking tool is embedded in its process for awarding additional works
packages. The tool is working as intended to achieve cost efficiencies.
Managing benefits
3 Key performance
indicators
Addressed
While MTIA did not develop new key performance indicators (KPIs), it has improved the level
of detail and usefulness of the data it uses to report against the existing KPIs.
4 Monitoring outcomes
Addressed
MTIA has developed a project-wide benefits framework that progressively monitors
outcomes.
Network integrity and standards governance
6 Network integrity
controls
In progress
DoT reviewed its network integrity controls in 2018 and is currently reviewing them again
following machinery of government changes. It is too early to tell if these changes will be
effective.
5 Network rail
standards
In progress
DoT has developed some network rail standards and is on track to finalise several more.
However, it needs to conduct further work to develop network requirements and fully embed
the governance process it uses to manage changes to engineering standards.
Note: Refer to Appendix C for the full recommendations.
4 | Follow up of Managing the Level Crossing Removal Program | Victorian Auditor-General´s Report
1.
Audit context
Established in 2015, the LXRP is one of the government’s major
transport infrastructure projects. It aims to reduce pressures on
the transport network by easing road congestion and travel
delays caused by level crossings. It also intends to improve safety
by decreasing the chance of accidents involving trains and road
users or pedestrians.
Our 2017 audit Managing the Level Crossing Removal Program
examined the effectiveness of the LXRP and made
10 recommendations to improve it.
This chapter provides essential background information about:
 Risks posed by level crossings
 The LXRP’s evolution
 Changes to government agencies since 2017
 Project delivery
 Options for removing level crossings
 Applying the HVHR framework
5 | Follow up of Managing the Level Crossing Removal Program | Victorian Auditor-General´s Report
1.1 Risks posed by level crossings
A level crossing is an intersection where a rail line crosses a road or path at the same
level.
Level crossings use boom gates to manage the flow of road and foot traffic across the
rail line. When boom gates are down for extended periods of time, traffic can become
congested. This can increase risk-taking behaviours by drivers and pedestrians.
Between 2005 and 2015, there were more than 149 level crossing collisions involving
a train and a vehicle or pedestrian in metropolitan Melbourne. Of these, 38 resulted in
fatalities and 22 in serious injuries.
The alternative to a level crossing is constructing an overhead bridge or underground
tunnel to separate the rail line from road and foot traffic.
1.2 The LXRP’s evolution
LXRP1: the first 50 sites
Following its election in 2014, the Victorian Government pursued its pre-election
commitment to remove 50 of Melbourne’s most dangerous and congested level
crossings by 2022. These 50 sites are listed in Appendix D. At the time, the project’s
estimated cost was $6.9 billion.
In 2015, the government established the Level Crossing Removal Authority (LXRA),
which was an administrative office within the then Department of Economic
Development, Jobs, Transport and Resources (DEDJTR).
LXRA was responsible for delivering LXRP1 and achieving:
 more reliable and efficient transport networks by addressing congestion and
delays caused by level crossings
 better connected, liveable and thriving communities by reducing delays and
increasing the attractiveness of living and investing in areas surrounding removed
crossings
 safer communities by removing conflict points between trains and road users and
pedestrians to reduce the number of crashes.
LXRP2: a further 25 sites
In October 2018, the government announced that it would remove a further 25 level
crossings through LXRP2.
The official LXRP covers 75 sites. However, MTIA is removing a further three sites that
need to be removed at the same time as one of the official project sites. Appendix D
contains the full list of all LXRP sites and their progress to date.
Project budget
As at 30 June 2020, MTIA has spent $6.2 billion of its $14.8 billion total funding. MTIA
is forecasting that it is on track to complete all 75 level crossing removals within
budget.
6 | Follow up of Managing the Level Crossing Removal Program | Victorian Auditor-General´s Report
To date, the Department of Treasury and Finance (DTF) has approved the release of
$1.28 billion of the project’s risk provision to address cost escalation pressures. The
remaining risk provision is $879 million.
Chapter 3 discusses how MTIA is using its procurement and packaging approach to
minimise project costs.
1.3 Changes to government agencies since our 2017 audit
Since our 2017 audit, machinery of government changes have altered the roles and
responsibilities of the agencies delivering the LXRP.
As Figure 1A shows, on 1 January 2019, the government abolished DEDJTR. It
replaced it with DoT and the Department of Jobs, Precincts and Regions. DoT also
absorbed the functions of:
 VicRoads, which managed the state’s road networks
 Transport for Victoria (TfV), which integrated the planning and coordination of
the state’s transport system
 Public Transport Victoria (PTV), which coordinated the public transport network
and managed its integrity.
At the same time, the government abolished LXRA and transferred responsibility for
the LXRP to MTIA—a newly formed administrative office within DoT.
MTIA is also responsible for delivering the government’s other major transport
infrastructure projects, including the Metro Tunnel, West Gate Tunnel, North East Link,
Regional Rail Revival and Melbourne Airport Rail.
FIGURE 1A: Machinery of government changes relevant to this audit
2017 department/agency Structure since 1 January 2019
DEDJTR DoT
TfV
PTV
VicRoads
LXRA MTIA
North East Link Authority
Western Distributor and West Gate Tunnel
Authorities
Major Road Projects Authority
Melbourne Metro Rail Authority
Note: In 2013, VicRoads began planning works to remove 10 level crossing sites. The government transferred
responsibility for this to LXRA in 2015.
Source: VAGO, based on information from DoT and MTIA.
Machinery of government
changes are changes to the
administrative structure of
government agencies. These can
include transferring functions from
one agency to another or
abolishing entire departments.
7 | Follow up of Managing the Level Crossing Removal Program | Victorian Auditor-General´s Report
Since the machinery of government changes:
 DoT is responsible for delivering the six recommendations we made to DEDJTR
 MTIA is responsible for delivering the four recommendations we made to LXRA.
Throughout this report we refer to DoT and MTIA, except for when we discuss former
agencies’ specific actions.
1.4 Project delivery
MTIA is delivering the LXRP using an alliance contracting model. Rather than
allocating individual contracts to remove each level crossing, MTIA groups multiple
sites into packages and then contracts program alliances to deliver them.
Program alliances
Following a competitive tender process, MTIA established four program alliances in
2017 to deliver different work packages:
 North Eastern Program Alliance (NEPA)
 North Western Program Alliance (NWPA)
 Southern Program Alliance (SPA)
 Western Program Alliance (WPA).
In 2018, NEPA split into two streams for road and rail:
 NEPA Rail
 NEPA Road.
This change was designed to maximise the expertise of the construction companies
that are part of NEPA.
In 2019, NEPA Rail and NEPA Road changed their names to the South Eastern
Program Alliance (SEPA) and the Metropolitan Roads Project Alliance (MRPA)
respectively.
Legally, there are still four program alliances. However, in practical terms MTIA is
working with five. Each program alliance has different program directors and
leadership teams.
Appendix D shows the full list of LXRP2 sites and Appendix F lists their program
alliance allocation.
Procurement approach
At the time of our 2017 audit, LXRA planned to use a deferred price contracting
structure to procure contractors to remove the remaining 32 level crossings.
Under this structure, program alliances would competitively bid for and complete an
initial package of works of between one and four level crossing sites. If LXRA was
satisfied with an alliance’s performance, it would then ask it to develop a formal
proposal for delivering additional sites. This meant that only the initial works package
would be subject to full price competition.
Alliance contracting is when a
state agency works with a group
or alliance of private sector parties
to deliver a project.
8 | Follow up of Managing the Level Crossing Removal Program | Victorian Auditor-General´s Report
In February 2019, MTIA introduced a new delivery strategy and allocated the
remaining LXRP1 sites and 25 additional LXRP2 sites to the program alliances.
While MTIA has now allocated all 75 sites, program alliances still need to provide a
detailed works proposal and costings before they are awarded a construction contract
for a package of sites. MTIA can reallocate sites to a different program alliance if it is
not satisfied with an alliance’s works proposal or past performance.
We discuss MTIA’s approach to procurement and packaging in Chapter 3.
1.5 Options for removing level crossings
As shown in Figure 1B, there are four options for separating the rail line from the road
to remove a level crossing. These are known as grade separation options.
MTIA analyses high-level issues, benefits and constraints for each level crossing site
before selecting an indicative preferred option.
FIGURE 1B: Grade separation options
Option Description
Potential
negative
impacts
Potential
benefits
Rail over road A rail bridge is
built over the
road.
The road remains
at the existing
level.
Train stations may
need to be
modified to suit
the new rail level.
It can improve
pedestrian access
and create
opportunities to
use the area
beneath the rail
line.
Rail under road A rail tunnel is
built beneath the
existing road.
The road remains
at the existing
level.
Nearby train
stations may need
to be modified or
rebuilt to suit the
new rail level.
Additional
pedestrian or
cycling bridges
can be built to
further improve
access across the
lowered rail line.
9 | Follow up of Managing the Level Crossing Removal Program | Victorian Auditor-General´s Report
Option Description
Potential
negative
impacts
Potential
benefits
Road over rail
The rail line
remains at the
existing level.
A road bridge is
constructed over
the rail line.
Service roads and
Modifications to
alternate access
options need to
be built.
train stations are
usually not
needed because
Pedestrian access
the rail level does
to train stations
needs to be
maintained.
not change.
Road under rail The rail line
remains at its
existing level.
An underpass is
built beneath the
rail line for the
road.
Service roads and
alternate access
options need to
be built.
Pedestrian access
to train stations
needs to be
maintained.
Modifications to
train stations are
usually not
needed because
the rail level does
not change.
Source: VAGO, based on images and information from MTIA.
Selecting a replacement option
To determine which grade separation option to use for each level crossing site, MTIA
considers:
 road functionality and rail operational requirements
 road and rail horizontal and vertical alignments
 construction challenges
 station locations and opportunities to improve the surrounding precinct
 requirements for land acquisition.
MTIA can also choose a hybrid approach that combines elements of different options.
10 | Follow up of Managing the Level Crossing Removal Program | Victorian Auditor-General´s Report
1.6 Applying the HVHR framework
The HVHR framework is a series of project assurance checks that DTF manages. These
checks scrutinise major infrastructure projects to increase the likelihood that they will
achieve their stated benefits on time and within budget.
DTF uses an assessment tool to determine a project’s risk profile. It considers a
project HVHR if it is:
 high risk according to its risk assessment tool
 medium risk according to its risk assessment tool and has a total estimated
investment of between $100 million and $250 million
 low risk according to its risk assessment tool, but has a total estimated
investment of more than $250 million
 identified by the government as needing the level of scrutiny applied to HVHR
investments.
According to DTF’s criteria, the LXRP is a HVHR project. While it is low risk, it requires
a total estimated investment of more than $250 million.
Investment life cycle and HVHR guidelines and gateway reviews
Like other HVHR projects, the LXRP is subject to DTF’s investment life cycle (ILC) and
HVHR guidelines. The guidelines outline the government’s process for investment
decision-making and project delivery across three stages:
 the business case
 procurement
 delivery.
HVHR projects need to complete ongoing quarterly progress reports for OPV. They
also undergo external gateway reviews to identify risks to their budget or delivery.
These reviews occur at the following six ’gates’:
 gate 1: concept and feasibility
 gate 2: business case
 gate 3: readiness for market
 gate 4: tender decision
 gate 5: readiness for service
 gate 6: benefits analysis.
The ILC and HVHR guidelines recommend that if a project involves multiple physical
sites, then the responsible agency should package gateway reviews for efficiency. For
the LXRP, works packages that meet the $250 million HVHR threshold undergo
gateway reviews, rather than the whole project.
OPV is as an administrative office
within DTF that works with
infrastructure delivery agencies to
report on major projects’
performance, costs, timelines,
scope and risks.
11 | Follow up of Managing the Level Crossing Removal Program | Victorian Auditor-General´s Report
2.
Developing LXRP2
Conclusion
Our 2017 audit found that DEDJTR did not analyse if the 50 level
crossing sites that the government had committed to remove
were the most dangerous and congested. We also found that
DEDJTR and LXRA did not develop a business case to outline the
project’s intended benefits before starting construction.
Since then, LXRA developed and applied a transparent process to
select sites for LXRP2. This new process has improved the
project’s cost-effectiveness because it uses delivery efficiency as
one of the criteria for site selection.
However, DEDJTR and LXRA did not develop a new business case
for LXRP2. This means that the government did not have vital
information about the project’s expected economic benefit before
it made its decision to invest.
This chapter discusses:
 LXRA’s site selection process for LXRP2
 The business case and advice to government
 How MTIA selected options for removing level crossings
12 | Follow up of Managing the Level Crossing Removal Program | Victorian Auditor-General´s Report
2.1 LXRA’s site selection process for LXRP2
In our 2017 audit, we found that DEDJTR did not assess the value of removing the
first 50 level crossings because they were based on the government’s 2014 election
commitment.
DEDJTR and LXRA did not provide detailed advice to the government on the project’s
expected benefits before construction began. This meant that the government could
not be assured that the selected sites met the project’s stated objective to remove the
most dangerous and congested level crossings.
We recommended that LXRA improve its site selection process for any future level
crossing removals.
Status of 2017 recommendation
Recommendation 2: Site selection process
We recommend that DEDJTR, in conjunction with the LXRA, develop a transparent selection and prioritisation process for
targeted removal of level crossings beyond current commitments made by government.
Status: Addressed
DEDJTR accepted this recommendation in 2017. It noted that the government had not committed to removing any
further level crossings.
MTIA (on behalf of DoT) has developed and applied a comprehensive and transparent site prioritisation framework to
select LXRP2 sites.
Progress and outcomes
From mid-2017 to late 2018, LXRA developed, refined and applied a transparent site
selection process for LXRP2. Figure 2A shows a timeline of LXRA’s work on LXRP2
during this period.
LXRA used three principles in its initial planning work as criteria to select LXRP2 sites:
 safety
 movement
 place.
Following advice from DoT, MTIA refined this to include a fourth principle—delivery
efficiency.
LXRA used these principles to select the most dangerous and congested sites for
LXRP2. LXRP2 also minimises delivery time and cost by removing sites that are next to
LXRP1 sites or other major projects.
Unlike its process for LXRP1, LXRA provided DEDJTR and the government with a
range of different project proposals before finalising the LXRP2 sites. These options
varied in size from 21 to 45 sites and ranged from $4 billion to $16 billion in cost.
13 | Follow up of Managing the Level Crossing Removal Program | Victorian Auditor-General´s Report
MTIA’s advice to the government for LXRP2 was a significant improvement to LXRP1.
This is because it provided the government with a comprehensive understanding of
what it could achieve for different investment levels.
FIGURE 2A: Timeline of planning and development work for LXRP2
Source: VAGO, based on information from MTIA and DoT.
Selecting LXRP2 sites
LXRA developed a site prioritisation framework to respond to our recommendation.
This framework outlines LXRA’s four principles for prioritising level crossing removals.
Figure 2B describes these principles and the underpinning factors that LXRA used to
assess each site.
14 | Follow up of Managing the Level Crossing Removal Program | Victorian Auditor-General´s Report
FIGURE 2B: Site selection principles and underpinning factors
Source: VAGO, based on information from MTIA.
As Figure 2C shows, LXRA’s framework has a five-stage process to determine which
sites to recommended for removal.
FIGURE 2C: LXRA’s site selection process
Source: VAGO, based on information from MTIA.
In stage one, LXRA analysed 276 level crossings using data from several sources,
including the Australian Level Crossing Assessment Model (ALCAM) and VicRoads’
traffic data.
In stage two, LXRA used the safety, movement and place principles to categorise each
site as having a ‛very high need’ or a ‛high need’ for removal. For example, Figure 2D
shows how LXRA defines high or very high need for the movement principle.
ALCAM is a nationally used tool
for identifying potential risks to, or
deficiencies at, level crossings. It is
also used to prioritise sites for
upgrades based on their incident
history, near misses, collisions,
fatalities and traffic data.
15 | Follow up of Managing the Level Crossing Removal Program | Victorian Auditor-General´s Report
FIGURE 2D: How LXRA used its movement principle to prioritise level crossing
removal sites
Source: VAGO, based on information from MTIA.
In stage three, LXRA identified and prioritised the sites that met the threshold for very
high need and high need for more than one principle.
As Figure 2E shows, LXRA then considered these sites using the delivery efficiency
principle in stage four.
FIGURE 2E: Stage 4 of LXRA’s site prioritisation framework
Source: VAGO, based on information from MTIA.
16 | Follow up of Managing the Level Crossing Removal Program | Victorian Auditor-General´s Report
LXRA used the following factors to assess if removing a level crossing would have a
delivery efficiency benefit:
LXRA considered …
to assess if …
future needs
the level crossing was likely to need removal in the
medium to long-term (beyond 2026) from a movement,
place or safety perspective.
corridor completion
removing two or fewer level crossings would separate an
entire rail corridor section from road and foot traffic.
land use opportunity
removing the level crossing would lead to other land use
and transport benefits, such as significant precinct or
urban renewal.
network importance
removing the site would significantly improve the
movement of people and goods across the transport
network.
In stage five, LXRA produced a consolidated list of 25 sites to submit to the
government for approval. Figure 2F shows that each site meets at least one of the
selection principles or criteria for delivery efficiency, adjacency or future need.
FIGURE 2F: LXRP2 sites’ prioritisation ratings for principles, delivery efficiency, adjacency and
future need
Level crossing site Safety Movement Place
Delivery
efficiency Adjacency
Future
need
Argyle Avenue, Chelsea High ✓ ✓
Camms Road, Cranbourne ✓ ✓ ✓
Cardinia Road, Pakenham High ✓ ✓
Chelsea Road, Chelsea High ✓ ✓
Cramer Street, Preston ✓ ✓
Evans Road, Lyndhurst ✓ ✓ ✓
Fitzgerald Road, Ardeer Very high High
Glen Huntly Road, Glen Huntly High ✓ ✓
Greens Road, Dandenong South Very high
McGregor Road, Pakenham High ✓ ✓
Main Street, Pakenham High High ✓ ✓
Mont Albert Road, Mont Albert ✓
17 | Follow up of Managing the Level Crossing Removal Program | Victorian Auditor-General´s Report
Level crossing site Safety Movement Place
Delivery
efficiency Adjacency
Future
need
Mt Derrimut Road, Deer Park Very high Very high High
Munro Street, Coburg ✓ ✓ ✓
Murray Road, Preston High ✓ ✓
Neerim Road, Glen Huntly High ✓ ✓
Oakover Road, Preston ✓ ✓
Old Geelong Road, Hoppers
Crossing
High High High ✓ ✓
Racecourse Road, Pakenham High ✓ ✓
Reynard Street, Coburg ✓ ✓ ✓
Robinsons Road, Deer Park Very high
Station Street/Gap Road, Sunbury High ✓ ✓
Swanpool Avenue, Chelsea ✓ ✓
Union Road, Surrey Hills High Very high ✓
Webster Street, Dandenong Very high
Source: VAGO, based on information from MTIA and ALCAM.
Balancing the site selection principles
While the site selection principles were not formally weighted, LXRA prioritised sites
that scored highly on the safety and movement principles. This means that LXRP2 is
more closely aligned with the project’s overall objective of removing dangerous and
congested level crossing sites than LXRP1.
Safety
LXRA used data from ALCAM to consider the number of past traffic incidents and the
risk of future incidents occurring at each site.
By using the safety principle to prioritise sites, LXRA selected:
 the three most dangerous level crossing sites in the state (Fitzgerald Road,
Ardeer; Mount Derrimut Road and Robinsons Road, Deer Park). While ALCAM
classifies these sites as ‛non-metropolitan’, LXRA selected them over metropolitan
sites with higher movement or congestion ratings because the risk scores for
these sites are significantly higher than those ranked fourth and below
 18 sites in ALCAM’s top 100 riskiest sites in the metropolitan area
 two sites that were rated as very high against the safety principle (Greens Road
and Webster Street in Dandenong). ALCAM ranked these sixth and eleventh in its
list of the state’s most dangerous sites.
Movement
The movement principle focuses on sites that have high levels of traffic congestion.
Congestion can increase the risk of accidents and risk-taking behaviour at level
crossings.
18 | Follow up of Managing the Level Crossing Removal Program | Victorian Auditor-General´s Report
LXRA used data from TfV, VicRoads and ALCAM to assess sites against the movement
principle.
LXRP2 sites have an above average level of daily trains and vehicle traffic. They also
have a higher number of predicted annual collisions. In particular, LXRP2 sites have:
 160.4 trains per day on average, compared to the state average of 19.55
 10 400 vehicles per day on average, compared to the state average of 1 822
 64 per cent more predicted annual collisions on average.
A further 32 per cent of LXRP2 sites have a medium to high risk of collisions
occurring. The level crossing with the highest level of traffic in the state (46 000 daily
vehicles) is Bell Street, Preston. This site is part of LXRP1 and is adjacent to three
LXRP2 sites.
Place
The place principle considers a site’s impact on pedestrian and cycle paths. It also
assesses how the level crossing affects access to important local community facilities,
such as schools, medical facilities and local shops. While LXRA consistently applied
the place principle in its site assessments, it did not select any of the LXRP2 sites
based on this principle alone.
LXRA identified five sites as having a high need according to the place principle. Of
these five sites, four had a delivery efficiency need. The other site—Mount Derrimut
Road, Deer Park—also had very high movement and safety needs.
Delivery efficiency
In our 2017 audit, we highlighted the absence of delivery efficiency in the criteria for
LXRP1. We suggested that LXRA should consider the potential cost and time savings
of removing sites located close together.
By adding delivery efficiency as one of its four site selection principles, LXRA took a
more strategic and future-focused approach for LXRP2. It selected LXRP2 sites that
minimised construction costs and rail service disruptions.
In our 2017 audit we identified five sites that LXRA should have considered for
removal because they were adjacent to other level crossing removal sites:
 three sites in Chelsea (Swanpool Avenue, Chelsea Road and Argyle Avenue)
 two sites in Glen Huntly (Neerim Road and Glen Huntly Road).
LXRA included all of these sites in LXRP2.
As Figure 2G shows, there is close association between LXRP1 and LXRP2 sites.
19 | Follow up of Managing the Level Crossing Removal Program | Victorian Auditor-General´s Report
FIGURE 2G: LXRP1 and LXRP2 site locations
Source: VAGO, based on information from MTIA.
LXRA also considered delivery efficiency by:
 selecting eight sites in LXRP2 based on delivery efficiency alone
 ensuring that 80 per cent of LXRP2 sites met the delivery efficiency principle. Of
these sites, 56 per cent are adjacent to other LXRP2 sites.
 selecting five sites that are located near current and future major transport
projects, such as the Cranbourne Line Upgrade and Metro Tunnel Project.
Figure 2H shows examples of how LXRA used the delivery efficiency principle to select
sites.
20 | Follow up of Managing the Level Crossing Removal Program | Victorian Auditor-General´s Report
FIGURE 2H: Examples of delivery efficiency outcomes for LXRP2 sites
LXRP2 sites Delivery efficiency outcome
Munro Street and Reynard
Street, Coburg
Delivered as a single works package with the LXRP1 level
crossings at Bell Street, Coburg and Moreland Road,
Brunswick.
Murray Road, Cramer Street
and Oakover Road, Preston
Integrated as a single works package with the LXRP1 level
crossing at Bell Street, Preston.
Argyle Street and Swanpool
Avenue, Chelsea
Packaged with LXRP1 sites Edithvale Road, Edithvale and
Station Street, Bonbeach.
Old Geelong Road,
Hoppers Crossing
Packaged with the LXRP1 site at Werribee Street, Werribee.
Webster Street and Greens
Road (Dandenong), Evans
Road (Lyndhurst) and
Camms Road (Cranbourne)
These sites, which are the four remaining level crossings on
the Cranbourne line, are packaged for removal in conjunction
with the Cranbourne Line Duplication project.
Source: VAGO, based on information from MTIA.
As Figure 2A shows, LXRA developed several options before submitting its final
25-site option to the government. The key difference between the site options it
developed in March 2018 and its final list was determined by the delivery efficiency
principle. Some sites that LXRA had initially considered for removal narrowly missed
inclusion in LXRP2 because they did not have a high delivery efficiency need.
However, none of these sites had a very high safety need.
2.2 Business case and advice to government
The primary purpose of a business case is to provide the government with enough
information to make an informed investment decision. Preparing a business case is
one of DTF’s key requirements for all HVHR infrastructure projects.
In our 2017 audit, we found that DEDJTR did not complete a business case until the
LXRP had been underway for two years. Consequently, DEDJTR did not follow DTF’s
HVHR framework to provide the government with a range of project options.
We also found that DEDJTR did not follow the HVHR framework to update the
business case to reflect significant project changes. While DEDJTR added two level
crossings to the project after completing the business case, it did not update it.
21 | Follow up of Managing the Level Crossing Removal Program | Victorian Auditor-General´s Report
Status of 2017 recommendation
Recommendation 1: Business case
We recommend that that DEDJTR follow the HVHR guidelines in developing a business case as the basis for government’s
decisions, including timing of approval, presenting a range of project options and updating the business case with any
significant changes.
Status: Partially addressed
DEDJTR accepted this audit recommendation in 2017. It noted that it would continue to work with DTF for future
investments to apply HVHR requirements.
While MTIA (on behalf of DoT) has not completed a business case or cost-benefit analysis for LXRP2, it has followed
other ILC and HVHR guidelines throughout LXRP2.
Progress and outcomes
We found that DoT and MTIA only partially addressed our recommendation. DoT did
not complete a new business case for LXRP2. Instead, DoT and MTIA approached
LXRP2 as an extension of the original project. They considered a new business case
unnecessary as the government had already made its decision to invest in an
expanded project.
While MTIA did not follow DTF’s ILC and HVHR guidelines for completing a business
case, its advice to government for LXRP2 did include most of the information that
HVHR projects require. This included a clear definition of the problem that the
investment will address and estimated costs and delivery timelines.
However, MTIA did not complete a cost-benefit analysis for the full 75-site project.
Cost-benefit analysis is a valuable tool for government decision-making that
quantifies the economic benefits of an investment decision. While the LXRP is on
track to achieve its intended safety and congestion benefits at each individual site, a
cost-benefit analysis would have enabled government to better understand the
expected economic benefits of its almost $15 billion investment.
Advice to government for LXRP2
A business case is the first step in DTF’s ILC and HVHR guidelines, which state that the
agency delivering a project should:
 establish the need that the project aims to address
 define the project’s intended benefits
 explore project options
 estimate costs
 outline the delivery process.
22 | Follow up of Managing the Level Crossing Removal Program | Victorian Auditor-General´s Report
As part of the 2019–20 state budget process, LXRA made a funding submission for
LXRP2. While LXRA did not complete a business case for LXRP2, most of the key
information it provided to the government aligned with the requirements of the
business case stage of DTF’s ILC and HVHR guidelines, including the project’s:
 cost estimates and budget, including budget allocations, scope, milestones and
estimates
 site prioritisation framework, including LXRP2’s overall benefits and alignment,
prioritisation process and selection options
 key considerations, including stakeholders, future needs, corridor completion,
land use and network importance
 delivery process, including formal responsibilities, agreements and risk mitigation
strategies.
Gateway review process
By not completing a business case, MTIA missed the first three gates in DTF’s gateway
review process, which provide early and independent scrutiny of a project’s
deliverability. Instead, MTIA established an internal review process that broadly
covered gates 1 to 3. This process included a:
 detailed assessment of the project’s progress by internal MTIA staff and external
consultants contracted by MTIA
 review by MTIA’s executive team and DTF representatives, which focused on the
budget estimate for each works package
 final stage where the contracted program alliance presented detailed works
package information and costings for MTIA’s executive review team and DTF
representatives, to assess.
DTF’s gate 4 reviews are designed to confirm that a project’s procurement and tender
evaluation stages are fulfilling its objectives, benefits plan and statutory requirements.
MTIA has completed 11 gate 4 reviews that cover four works packages. The
independent gateway reviewers engaged by DTF gave each package a ‘green’ project
compliance rating. This means that the reviewer found no significant issues that
threatened the cost, quality or timeliness of a work package’s delivery.
2.3 Assessing options for removing level crossings
Our 2017 audit raised concerns that LXRA was not using a consistent approach to
assess grade separation options for all 50 sites.
As part of LXRP’s business case, which was finalised in 2017, LXRA developed a grade
separation options assessment framework. However, prior to this, LXRA and VicRoads
selected the first 20 sites without clear criteria.
In its grade separation options assessment framework, LXRA included a multi-criteria
analysis tool to help it select the remaining 30 sites. However, we found that this
framework did not weigh the selection criteria.
23 | Follow up of Managing the Level Crossing Removal Program | Victorian Auditor-General´s Report
We also found that LXRA used a different approach for Frankston line sites, which
considered the impact of removal options on adjacent properties. LXRA did not use
this criterion to assess any grade separation options for LXRP2.
Status of 2017 recommendation
Recommendation 7: Options assessment
We recommend that the LXRA apply options assessments transparently and consistently.
Status: Addressed
LXRA accepted this recommendation in 2017. It also noted that it may add additional information and criteria to its grade
separation options assessment framework to provide the best possible advice to government.
MTIA has:
 revised the process it uses to select grade separation options
 applied the process consistently and transparently for the 25 LXRP2 sites.
Progress and outcomes
Since our 2017 audit, MTIA has transparently and consistently applied its grade
separation options assessment framework for LXRP2 and the remaining LXRP1 sites.
The framework uses a three-stage approach to select a grade separation option for
each site:
 Stage 1: MTIA conducts a preliminary assessment to identify an ‘indicative’ option
to estimate a site’s removal costs.
 Stage 2: MTIA conducts a detailed site investigation, design assessment and
consults with the local community.
 Stage 3: MTIA submits its preferred option to the Minister for Transport
Infrastructure for final approval.
In response to our 2017 audit, MTIA completed detailed site investigations to reassess
grade separation options for the remaining LXRP1 sites. MTIA has not used the
approach it took for LXRP1 sites on the Frankston line to select any other grade
separation options.
In late 2018, the government announced the 25 LXRP2 sites and specified an
indicative grade separation option for each.
MTIA advised us that over the course of the LXRP, it has developed its knowledge
about what options are feasible for different sites. Consequently, it has changed fewer
grade separation options after its Stage 1 assessments. This means that MTIA’s
community consultations only focus on options that are achievable within
engineering and budget constraints.
24 | Follow up of Managing the Level Crossing Removal Program | Victorian Auditor-General´s Report
3.
Procurement and packaging
Conclusion
Our 2017 audit found that LXRA’s procurement approach may not
achieve value for money because not all sites would be subject to
full price competition. While LXRA had set up mechanisms to
minimise costs, these were untested.
MTIA has since changed its procurement approach. While this has
further reduced price competition, MTIA is using its benchmarking
tool effectively to manage costs. It is also incentivising the
program alliances to share lessons learnt to achieve cost savings
across the whole project.
This chapter discusses:
 MTIA’s procurement approach for LXRP2
 Packaging sites for removal
 Benchmarking and minimising costs
25 | Follow up of Managing the Level Crossing Removal Program | Victorian Auditor-General´s Report
3.1 MTIA’s procurement approach for LXRP2
At the time of our 2017 audit, LXRA had planned to apply full price competition to
25 per cent of the 32 remaining LXRP1 sites and procure the rest through a deferred
pricing contract structure.
We found that this could pose a risk to achieving value for money because not all
sites would be subject to full price competition.
We also found that it could encourage program alliances to engage in loss-leading
behaviours, such as bidding low in initial tendering to secure an advantage when
bidding for the remaining sites.
Status of 2017 recommendation
Recommendation 8: Procurement
We recommend that the LXRA commission an independent evaluation and report on whether the deferred pricing contract
structure is cost-effective and has delivered its benefits.
Status: Addressed
LXRA accepted this recommendation in 2017. It noted that LXRA would commission an independent evaluation of the
LXRP’s deferred pricing contract structure at an appropriate time during its delivery.
MTIA reviewed and incorporated lessons learnt into its procurement strategy for LXRP2. Additionally, OPV has
independently reviewed the LXRP’s contracting structure as part of its project assurance review process. Together, these
actions have assured MTIA that its contracting approach is cost-effective.
Progress and outcomes
Following the government’s announcement in 2018 that it would remove a further
25 level crossings, MTIA developed a new procurement strategy to integrate these
sites into the existing project.
MTIA’s new procurement strategy allocated all of the remaining LXRP1 sites and the
LXRP2 sites to one of the five existing program alliances. This approach differed from
LXRA’s original plan to leave some sites unallocated to drive competition among
program alliances for the remaining sites. Appendix F shows the program alliance
packages for LXRP1 and LXRP2.
Since 2017, the infrastructure construction market in Victoria has continued to
experience unprecedented demand. This has shifted market dynamics and has
encouraged contractors to seek higher profits, more favourable risk allocation and be
more selective in the projects they bid for.
However, the program alliances had already agreed to the key costs of their LXRP
works packages, including corporate overheads, profit percentages and labour
on-costs for staff. By providing the program alliances with a stable pipeline of works,
MTIA has secured better resource allocation and planning because contractors have
their resources locked in over the short to medium term.
26 | Follow up of Managing the Level Crossing Removal Program | Victorian Auditor-General´s Report
MTIA’s procurement approach also mitigates the risk of delays due to competition
with other projects over access to the same section of rail track because MTIA and
DoT can plan works well in advance.
Project assurance review
In August 2019, OPV completed a project assurance review on the LXRP. It found that
MTIA’s procurement model was a ‛good basis’ for delivering the 75 level crossing
removals by 2025.
OPV acknowledged that MTIA’s packaging approach is less competitive than a
traditional tender process. However, OPV found that MTIA is successfully using
several mechanisms to achieve efficiencies. These mechanisms include a cost
benchmarking tool, independent price estimator and a performance reward system
that incentivises program alliances to collaborate. We discuss these mechanisms
further in section 3.3.
3.2 Packaging sites for removal
The LXRP’s 2017 business case considered two options for packaging the then
30 remaining level crossings sites:
 a corridor approach, which grouped sites along the same rail corridors
 a discipline-based approach, which grouped sites that required similar types of
works (such as modifying stations, power, signalling, and rail track).
LXRA determined that the corridor approach effectively balanced time pressures and
the need to manage service disruptions. As a result, it packaged most of the
remaining LXRP1 sites using this approach.
In our 2017 audit, we found that LXRA did not consider which sites had the highest
priority for removal from a safety or rail efficiency perspective in its packaging
approach.
We recommended that LXRA evaluate its packaging approach as the project
progressed to ensure that it could incorporate lessons learnt into its future packaging
decisions.
Project assurance reviews provide
timely independent advice on the
progress of HVHR projects to both
the government (as the investor)
and the delivery department or
agency.
27 | Follow up of Managing the Level Crossing Removal Program | Victorian Auditor-General´s Report
Status of 2017 recommendation
Recommendation 10: Packaging
We recommend that the LXRA, in conjunction with TfV, evaluate its packaging approach and incorporate lessons learned into
future crossing removals.
Status: Addressed
MTIA accepted this recommendation in 2017. It noted that it will incorporate the lessons it learns from its LXRP1
packaging approach when planning future level crossing removals.
MTIA has not commissioned a formal evaluation of its packing approach. However, it has incorporated lessons learnt
from LXRP1 into its packaging and procurement approach for LXRP2.
Progress and outcomes
MTIA has continued to take a broadly corridor-based approach to packaging sites.
However, this approach is more flexible and considers the benefits of grouping sites
according to construction technique and proximity to other work sites. This approach
is allowing MTIA to balance cost, timeliness and the expertise of different program
alliances.
In February 2019, the government approved MTIA’s new site allocation framework,
which outlines how it allocates works packages to the five program alliances. The
framework builds on LXRA’s initial corridor-based approach and includes the
following new criteria for packaging sites:
 construction technique, which involves allocating works based on the expected
grade separation option
 capability, which involves allocating works to program alliances based on their
past performance
 proximity, which involves allocating works based on whether a site is near
another major transport infrastructure project site
 capacity, which involves allocating works based on workforce skills or availability.
MTIA did not formally review its packaging approach when it developed its site
allocation framework. However, MTIA did incorporate lessons learnt from LXRP1, such
as packaging sites to minimise disruption for commuters and reducing costs by
grouping sites that use similar construction techniques.
As discussed in Chapter 2, delivery efficiency was one of MTIA’s core principles for
selecting LXRP2 sites. This principle required MTIA to consider the cost and time
savings of selecting sites that were close to other LXRP sites or major projects.
This is an important shift since our 2017 audit and shows that MTIA is proactively
incorporating lessons learnt from earlier removals into LXRP2. By packaging sites that
are close enough to be removed during the same construction period, MTIA can
minimise disruptions to public transport users and local residents.
28 | Follow up of Managing the Level Crossing Removal Program | Victorian Auditor-General´s Report
3.3 Benchmarking and minimising costs
Our 2017 audit found that while using program alliances with partial price
competition saves time, it removes competitive tension. To address this risk, LXRA
developed a number of mechanisms to minimise costs, including a benchmarking
tool.
At the time of our 2017 audit, LXRA had only applied the benchmarking tool to its
procurement for NEPA.
Status of 2017 recommendation
Recommendation 9: Benchmarking
We recommend that the LXRA embed its benchmarking tool into the procurement process before using it to award additional
works sites.
Status: Addressed
MTIA accepted this recommendation in 2017. It noted that it had already embedded the benchmarking tool in its
procurement approach for awarding additional works packages.
MTIA has:
 embedded its benchmarking tool into its process for awarding additional works packages. The tool is working as
intended to achieve cost efficiencies
 successfully implemented other mechanisms to manage costs, including a Joint Coordination Committee (JCC) that
allows program alliances to share knowledge and improve efficiency for future removals.
Progress and outcomes
Since our 2017 audit, MTIA has fully embedded its benchmarking tool into its process
for awarding additional works packages. The tool is working to ensure that packaged
works are cost-efficient by requiring program alliances to submit a target outturn cost
(TOC) that is broadly in line with the LXRP benchmarking tool. MTIA has also
successfully implemented other mechanisms to manage costs, including the JCC.
Awarding additional works packages
MTIA has allocated all of the remaining sites to program alliances. However, program
alliances still need to develop a detailed project proposal and TOC before they are
formally awarded an additional works package.
MTIA has developed a framework to assess value for money when awarding
additional works packages. This framework includes:
 developing a benchmark cost estimate using its benchmarking tool
 engaging an independent estimator to examine the costs proposed by a
program alliance
 assessing a program alliance’s performance using performance monitoring
reports
In this context, a TOC is the
estimated cost of designing,
constructing and delivering a
package of level crossing removals
and any associated works, such as
constructing new stations.
29 | Follow up of Managing the Level Crossing Removal Program | Victorian Auditor-General´s Report
 assessing non-price elements, including a program alliance’s proposed approach
to construction, delivery, continuous improvement, risk management and
stakeholder management.
Benchmarking tool
MTIA’s benchmarking tool is a database that includes cost information from previous
level crossing removals, the Regional Rail Link Project and VicRoads. MTIA adds new
data over time, which ensures that the tool can provide realistic construction cost
estimates.
MTIA uses the benchmarking tool to develop a benchmark cost estimate for each
additional works package. MTIA provides program alliances with a high-level price to
assist them when developing their cost estimate.
MTIA incentivises program alliances to submit a TOC that is less than the benchmark
by increasing their performance award if they are successful.
In this way, MTIA’s benchmarking tool encourages program alliances to compete
against MTIA when developing cost estimates for additional works packages, instead
of competing against each other.
Independent estimator
MTIA also appoints an independent estimator to examine TOCs submitted by
program alliances.
The independent estimator uses their own benchmarking data to assess if a program
alliance’s TOC is realistic and based on accurate assumptions.
Using an independent estimator provides assurance that both MTIA and program
alliances are using robust and comprehensive price information.
Site reallocations
To date, MTIA has reallocated two additional works packages to a different program
alliance due to cost and performance issues:
MTIA reallocated
Because …
High Street, Reservoir
from NEPA to NWPA
 NEPA could not develop a competitive TOC using
a suitable design solution.
Werribee Street, Werribee
from MRPA to WPA
 WPA had a strong capability to deliver MTIA’s
preferred grade separation option.
 WPA would achieve delivery efficiency and
minimise disruptions for commuters because it
could remove the Werribee Street level crossing
at the same time as the Old Geelong Road level
crossing in Hoppers Crossing.
30 | Follow up of Managing the Level Crossing Removal Program | Victorian Auditor-General´s Report
These reallocations demonstrate that MTIA’s benchmarking tool is working as
intended. They also indicate that MTIA is taking a proactive approach to monitoring
value for money.
Sharing lessons learnt
While there is now less direct competition between program alliances, MTIA has
successfully incentivised them to share lessons learnt and re-use ideas to achieve cost
savings.
Typically, contractors are in competition with each other and are keen to protect their
intellectual property because it gives them a competitive advantage when bidding for
work.
By tentatively allocating all of the remaining sites, MTIA has encouraged program
alliances to work together and share information to help achieve cost efficiencies
across the whole project.
The JCC is one mechanism that program alliances can use to discuss their work and
share ideas. The JCC includes 13 subcommittees, which are organised by discipline or
topic, such as sustainability. The JCC has an online document sharing site that all
program alliances can access to share information.
MTIA modelled this approach on a similar framework used for the Regional Rail Link
project. It has further strengthened this approach by offering program alliances
incentives to collaborate.
In 2018, OPV found that the JCC was a key mechanism for encouraging a culture of
sharing and continuous improvement across the LXRP.
At the time of our 2017 audit, LXRA’s performance reward regime included
two indicators that focused on improvement—one for continuous improvement and
another for innovation. In 2018, LXRP replaced these two indicators with:
 ‛adding value’, which combines the continuous improvement and innovation
indicators and measures if program alliances share learnings about better
practice
 ‛adoption’, which rewards a program alliance when it uses a solution from
another alliance, such as the same station design.
These indicators encourage program alliances to share ideas, rather than rewarding
them for developing unique design solutions. By doing this, the LXRP has the
potential to achieve cost savings through economies of scale because program
alliances can adopt similar designs that require the same standard components and
materials.
31 | Follow up of Managing the Level Crossing Removal Program | Victorian Auditor-General´s Report
4.
Managing benefits
Conclusion
In 2017 we found that LXRA was using unclear KPIs to measure
the benefits of individual level crossing removals. We also found
that LXRA was not progressively monitoring whether the project
was achieving its intended benefits.
MTIA has improved the amount and quality of data it uses to
measure KPIs for individual sites. It has also introduced a process
to annually monitor the project’s overall progress. As a result,
MTIA now has a comprehensive understanding of how the project
is progressing and whether it is on track to achieve its intended
benefits.
This chapter discusses:
 KPIs for level crossing removal sites
 How MTIA monitors the project’s outcomes
32 | Follow up of Managing the Level Crossing Removal Program | Victorian Auditor-General´s Report
4.1 KPIs for level crossing removal sites
Benefits management is a core part of effective project delivery. It involves setting
defined objectives and KPIs at the start of a project and monitoring if these are
achieved.
Under the LXRP benefits management plan, MTIA uses 14 KPIs to measure if each
individual site is achieving its intended benefits. However, our 2017 audit found that
these KPIs did not set clearly defined benchmarks for improvement.
Many of the KPIs were binary measures. This means that simply removing a level
crossing would be considered an improvement. For example:
 100 per cent of sites with road-based public transport will have improved
punctuality (KPI 1.3b)
 100 per cent of sites will have improved access to local activity centres and major
services (KPI 2.3b).
In 2017, we recommended that MTIA’s benefit reports include a discussion of the
results and the extent of any improvements, rather than simply stating if a KPI has
been met.
Status of 2017 recommendation
Recommendation 3: KPIs
We recommend that DEDJTR develop comprehensive KPIs and targets to meaningfully measure achievement of intended
benefits.
Status: Addressed
DEDJTR accepted this recommendation in 2017. It noted that it would implement it by enhancing the analysis and
commentary in its site benefits reports under the LXRP benefits management plan.
MTIA has since improved the amount and quality of information it uses to report against the KPIs. Consequently,
MTIA’s site benefits reports now provide a more comprehensive qualitative assessment of whether level crossing
removals are achieving their intended benefits or not.
Progress and outcomes
MTIA advised us that following our 2017 audit, it considered if it could develop
benchmarks for each KPI. However, it determined that it was not feasible to fully
model data for every KPI at every site to create a specific benchmark. Instead, it
decided to focus on providing more detailed information and commentary.
At the time of our 2017 audit, LXRA had four draft site benefits reports, but these
included limited data.
Since our 2017 audit, MTIA has increased the level of detail and analysis in its site
benefits reports.
33 | Follow up of Managing the Level Crossing Removal Program | Victorian Auditor-General´s Report
As a result, the reports now provide more comprehensive information about the
extent to which an individual level crossing removal has achieved its intended
benefits.
At June 2020, MTIA has:
 completed 10 individual site benefits reports
 19 reports in draft
 a further five sites where drafting has not commenced. MTIA advised us that this
is because traffic patterns have not returned to normal yet. Drivers avoid level
crossings sites during construction, and it takes some time for them to return
once the area reopens.
The 10 completed reports include the four reports that were in draft at the time of
our 2017 audit. Each individual site report is approximately 35 pages and provides
contextual information and an assessment of the extent to which each KPI has been
met. For example, instead of just stating that removing a crossing as improved travel
time for vehicles (KPI 1.1a), the reports specify the minutes saved.
This qualitative and contextual material is more meaningful than a binary report that
simply states if the KPIs have been met.
Appendix E lists the 15 KPIs that MTIA set for the LXRP benefits management plan.
KPI results
Of the 10 sites with completed benefits reports, MTIA has:
 achieved 70 per cent (105) of the KPIs
 not met 21 per cent (31) of the KPIs
 not finalised a further 9 per cent (14) of the KPIs.
Figure 4A shows these results.
FIGURE 4A: Percentage of KPIs achieved for the first 10 level crossings removed
Source: VAGO, based on information from MTIA.
Achieved
Partially achieved
Not met
Not applicable
34 | Follow up of Managing the Level Crossing Removal Program | Victorian Auditor-General´s Report
The completed site benefit reports show improved travel times and an increased level
of traffic flow. For example:
 the number of vehicles travelling through the 10 sites has increased by
24 per cent on average (KPI 1.1b—reducing congestion and improving traffic
flow)
 the average improvement in travel time for vehicles at the 10 sites is one minute
during the morning and evening peak periods (KPI 1.1a)
 Blackburn Road, Blackburn, had the greatest improvement for vehicle throughput
with an increase of 60 per cent for northbound peak hour traffic in the morning.
Of the unmet KPIs, 16 are due to a lack of pre-removal data for sites that VicRoads
was initially responsible for. As the LXRP progresses, there will be fewer sites without
suitable baseline data, and the quality of MTIA’s KPI reporting will therefore improve.
Other unmet KPIs are also due to data gaps. For example, MTIA cannot yet conclude
against KPI 3.1a because it requires three years’ worth of data to assess if a level
crossing removal has had any negative safety outcomes.
4.2 How MTIA monitors the project’s outcomes
In our 2017 audit, we found that there was insufficient data to make an informed
judgement on how well the project was progressing towards achieving its intended
outcomes.
At the time, LXRA advised us that when it completes all of the removals, it intends to
combine the individual site benefit reports into a holistic project report. However, we
found that waiting until the project is complete would mean that LXRA would have
limited insight into how the LXRP is progressing towards realising its benefits.
Status of 2017 recommendation
Recommendation 4: Monitoring project outcomes
We recommend that DEDJTR, in conjunction with the LXRA, progressively monitor the progress of achievement of LXRP
outcomes to facilitate timely insight into how the program is progressing towards benefits realisation.
Status: Addressed
DEDJTR accepted this recommendation in 2017. It noted that it was already implementing it because it was also a
requirement under the HVHR framework.
MTIA (on behalf of DoT) has developed a project-wide benefits framework that progressively monitors its outcomes.
According to the framework’s annual reports, the LXRP is on track to achieve slightly more benefits than the original
business case anticipated.
KPI 3.1a measures if 100 per cent
of treated sites have zero crashes
and near miss incidents involving
trains as a result of the level
crossing removal and no negative
safety outcomes as a result of the
removal works.
35 | Follow up of Managing the Level Crossing Removal Program | Victorian Auditor-General´s Report
Progress and outcomes
Following our 2017 audit, MTIA developed the LXRP Benefits Framework. This
framework is designed to increase the transparency of the LXRP’s overall progress,
outcomes, benefits and performance.
Project benefits reports
The LXRP Benefits Framework requires MTIA to annually report on the LXRP’s overall
progress. Complementing the site benefits reports, these project benefits reports
provide a progressive and timely assessment of whether the project is achieving its
overall objectives.
The project benefits reports also aim to assess the wider economic, social and
environmental benefits that the project has created or enabled, which are broader
than the site-specific KPIs.
MTIA measures and reports on the project benefits across four domains, as outlined
in the 2017 business case:
 Communities are more mobile and connected.
 Communities are more productive.
 Communities are more vibrant and safer.
 Communities are more sustainable.
MTIA measures the benefits of each domain at two levels:
 the project level, which aggregates information about all sites
 the corridor level, which describes the combined benefits of removing level
crossings along a specific rail corridor. For example, the Cranbourne to Pakenham
rail corridor.
MTIA has completed two project benefit reports—one at 30 June 2018 and one at
30 June 2019.
The 2019 report includes data analysis and economic modelling undertaken by an
external consultant. Based on data from 26 removed sites, the 2019 report found that
the project is achieving:
 7.6 per cent higher travel time savings for road and train users at removed level
crossing sites than forecast
 17.5 per cent higher reliability savings than forecast.
This means that travel time benefits across the whole transport network are
3.5 per cent higher than the original business plan forecast.
While the annual project benefits reports provide a useful point-in-time assessment,
the results are uneven. This is because the individual sites do not contribute equally to
the project’s overall benefits. The removal of some sites will have a greater impact on
the network than others.
For example, while the 2019 report found that overall travel time benefits are
3.5 per cent higher than the original business plan, this is a decrease compared to the
benefits reported at 30 June 2018. At that time, LXRA had data for nine sites and
36 | Follow up of Managing the Level Crossing Removal Program | Victorian Auditor-General´s Report
observed that travel time benefits were 17 per cent higher than forecast in the
business case.
The project benefits reports are not publicly available. However, MTIA does include
some information from case studies on its website. Given that the business case for
the first 50 sites was not completed until LXRA had started construction, providing
public updates on the LXRP’s benefits would improve transparency around the
project.
Gate 5 and 6 reviews
In addition to MTIA’s annual project and individual site benefits reports, DTF’s
gateway reviews are providing independent assurance that the LXRP is achieving its
intended benefits.
As discussed in Chapter 2, all HVHR projects must go through DTF’s gateway review
process. In December 2018, MTIA received a joint gate 5 and 6 report for 10 LXRP1
sites.
MTIA advised us that DTF combined the gate 5 and 6 reviews for some packages. This
was because some packages included sites that had already been operational for
two years by the time the review started, which limited the benefits of a standalone
gate 5 review.
The 10 sites that DTF reviewed in 2018 were part of packages 1, 2 and 4, which
VicRoads started and LXRA completed. LXRP packages are listed in Appendix F.
The independent gateway reviewer engaged by DTF assessed the 10 sites’ overall
delivery confidence as ‛good’. It also noted that LXRA had successfully managed a
high volume of work, a challenging timeline and the current ‛heated’ construction
market.
While the gate 5 and 6 report was positive, it did not cover any sites that were fully
delivered by LXRA/MTIA through the program alliance model. This means that MTIA
is yet to fully compare the benefits of its contracting approaches.
MTIA advised us that it has not set the next gate 5 and 6 review date with DTF. It
estimates that this will take place in early 2021. This review will assess the benefits of
MTIA’s new procurement approach compared to the earlier approach.
It is important that DTF and MTIA continue to complete timely gate reviews so they
can identify any issues that could impact the LXRP achieving its benefits as early as
possible.
OPV’s major projects performance reports
In addition to internal reports and gate reviews, MTIA and DoT provide information to
OPV for inclusion in its quarterly major projects’ performance reports. These reports
to government highlight emerging risks and issues in major infrastructure and
information technology projects, which includes the LXRP.
In its June 2020 report, OPV noted that LXRP is experiencing cost pressures related to
the escalating cost of labour and materials. However, OPV gave the project an overall
‘amber’ risk rating. This means that it considers that MTIA is managing the identified
risks and no government action is needed at this time.
Gate 5 reviews assess if an asset or
service is ready for delivery. Gate 6
reviews examine if a project has
delivered its benefits as defined in
its business case.
37 | Follow up of Managing the Level Crossing Removal Program | Victorian Auditor-General´s Report
As discussed in Chapter 3, MTIA is using several mechanisms to minimise costs.
38 | Follow up of Managing the Level Crossing Removal Program | Victorian Auditor-General´s Report
5.
Network integrity and standards
governance
Conclusion
Our 2017 audit found significant weaknesses in PTV’s network
integrity controls and the process it used to manage changes to
engineering standards.
While DoT has introduced new systems to govern standards and
assure network integrity, 2019 machinery of government changes
have made further work necessary. Until this work is complete,
there is a risk that project delivery agencies and contractors may
be unsure about the standards their projects need to meet.
DoT is also yet to develop system-level network requirements,
which means it lacks a holistic view of the public transport
network’s technical needs. DoT does not have a documented plan
to complete this work in a timely way.
This chapter discusses:
 Network integrity controls
 Network standards
39 | Follow up of Managing the Level Crossing Removal Program | Victorian Auditor-General´s Report
5.1 Network integrity controls
Strong network integrity controls support a transport system to work as a coherent
whole. They also ensure that individual infrastructure projects fit seamlessly into the
network.
In our 2017 audit, we found that PTV did not have adequate resources to ensure the
transport network’s integrity. We also noted that while PTV had established a new
network integrity governance framework in November 2017, it was too early to tell if
it would be effective.
Status of 2017 recommendation
Recommendation 6: Network integrity
We recommend that DEDJTR, in conjunction with PTV, monitor the effectiveness of PTV’s controls to improve its network
integrity function.
Status: In progress
DEDJTR accepted this recommendation in 2017. It noted that TfV and PTV had completed a review and implemented a
revised network assurance governance framework.
DoT has:
 significantly improved its network integrity controls and capability in 2018 and 2019
 introduced a new project and network governance framework following machinery of government changes.
As this new framework is still at an early stage, DoT will need to monitor its effectiveness.
Progress and outcomes
During 2018 and 2019, PTV and DoT progressively monitored their network integrity
controls. They also made changes to improve how the controls ensure that major
infrastructure projects integrate with the public transport network.
While DoT introduced a new network and project governance framework in
March 2020, work on this recommendation is still in progress:
Since 2017 DoT has …
However …
secured funding to fulfill its network
integrity role.
DoT has not confirmed resourcing for
this beyond 2020–21.
introduced a new network and project
governance framework.
It is too early to tell if this framework
will be effective.
Network integrity refers to how
functionally effective, reliable,
maintainable, secure, safe and
environmentally compatible a
public transport network is.
40 | Follow up of Managing the Level Crossing Removal Program | Victorian Auditor-General´s Report
Since 2017 DoT has …
However …
established an assurance process to
manage how major projects integrate
with the network.
DoT will need to refine this assurance
process to align with the new network
and project governance framework.
There is also a risk that this may confuse
delivery agencies and contractors.
Assurance process for infrastructure projects
In 2019, DoT introduced a network integrity assurance management procedure. This
procedure outlines the assurance activities that DoT and infrastructure delivery
agencies need to complete throughout a project’s life cycle to ensure it will integrate
with the overall public transport network.
Under the assurance procedure, DoT conducts reviews throughout a project’s life
cycle to confirm that the delivery agency is managing network risks. DoT also assesses
how effectively the project will integrate with the existing public transport network.
MTIA is following the assurance procedure for LXRP works packages and providing
DoT with the evidence it needs to complete its assurance reports.
Network and project governance framework
In January 2019, machinery of government changes transferred the responsibility for
the road network from VicRoads to DoT. In March 2020, DoT introduced a network
and project governance framework to integrate road and rail network integrity
controls.
While infrastructure delivery agencies’ project assurance responsibilities have stayed
the same, the framework has replaced two key governance bodies with new
committees.
DoT has established a change management process to ensure that infrastructure
delivery agencies and contractors understand the new framework. DoT is updating its
key policies, including its network integrity assurance management procedure, to
align with the new framework.
5.2 Network standards
As part of its network integrity and assurance role, DoT is responsible for setting
network technical standards (NTS). These define the specific engineering and
technical requirements that transport infrastructure and assets need to meet to
ensure compatibility and consistency across the entire transport network. In addition
to NTS, rail operators also develop their own engineering standards that relate to the
parts of the network they are responsible for.
In 2017, we found that PTV did not have NTS. Instead, Victoria’s rail network relied on
the Victorian Rail Industry Operators’ Group standards, which PTV did not oversee.
41 | Follow up of Managing the Level Crossing Removal Program | Victorian Auditor-General´s Report
This meant that PTV did not have control over new standards or changes to existing
standards. Consequently, it could not manage the risk that ad hoc changes could
affect the network’s integrity.
We also found a risk that changes to engineering standards could have time and cost
impacts on in-progress projects that had been approved using earlier standards. The
agencies delivering these projects would need to alter works or seek waivers from the
new standards.
Status of 2017 recommendation
Recommendation 5: Network standards
We recommend that DEDJTR, in conjunction with PTV, develop contemporary network rail standards, so that agencies delivering
rail projects have an understanding of network requirements and what is required to assure projects meet engineering, network
integration and safety requirements.
Status: In progress
DEDJTR accepted this recommendation in 2017 and noted that it was already being implemented. At the time, TfV was
developing new rail standards with input from PTV, Metro Trains Melbourne (Metro Trains), LXRA and the Melbourne
Metro Rail Authority.
DoT has since developed a set of NTS and a standards governance framework. However, it still has work to do to further
develop system-wide technical standards and embed standards governance.
Progress and outcomes
Since 2017, PTV and DoT have endorsed 13 NTS, which cover all of the rail network’s
major technical components. These include track, traction power, public transport
precincts and operational control management systems. DoT and PTV are developing
a further five NTS.
In addition, DoT has introduced a standards governance framework to oversee
changes to NTS. However, DoT still has work to do to address the risks raised in our
2017 audit:
DoT has not …
This creates a risk that …
updated its standards governance
framework to align with its new project
and network governance framework.
delivery agencies and contractors may
be confused about their responsibilities
as key governance committees have
been replaced or merged.
developed high-level network
requirements.
infrastructure projects may not align
with the transport network’s future
technical needs because DoT has not
set a clear vision.
42 | Follow up of Managing the Level Crossing Removal Program | Victorian Auditor-General´s Report
New standards governance framework
Before construction begins on an infrastructure project, the delivery agency outlines
the project’s agreed outcomes. It also defines the minimum system requirements that
contractors need to meet to ensure that the project seamlessly integrates with the
transport network.
NTS and engineering standards change over time. If changes have significant safety
impacts, then contractors may need to change their plans to meet the new
requirements.
As part of its franchise agreement with rail operator Metro Trains, PTV established a
standards governance group in early 2018. This group ensures that Metro Train’s
engineering standards align with the network’s overall technical standards.
In 2019, DoT built on this governance group and introduced an expanded standards
governance framework. The new standards governance framework:
 manages the development and maintenance of NTS
 manages the relationship between NTS, operator-developed engineering
standards and related user policies and guides
 includes several DoT-run governance committees that:
 endorse new or revised standards
 ensure that any changes align with network requirements
 determine if in-progress projects need to adopt a new or changed standard
 clearly defines the roles and responsibilities for DoT, project delivery agencies, rail
operators and contractors.
MTIA advised us that while DoT’s new standards governance framework is a
significant improvement since our 2017 audit, some changes are still causing
confusion for delivery agencies and contractors.
One example of ongoing confusion is Metro Train’s recent engineering directive on
axle counters. Axle counters detect if a section of
rail track is clear or occupied by
recognising the presence of train
axles. Axle counters are an
important part of rail safety.
43 | Follow up of Managing the Level Crossing Removal Program | Victorian Auditor-General´s Report
FIGURE 5A: Case study: Metro Trains’ directive on axle counters
In December 2019, Metro Trains issued a chief engineer’s
directive on rail condition requirements for axle counters.
This was a stopgap measure before the new engineering
standard was endorsed.
In January 2020, MTIA alerted DoT that Metro Trains had issued the
directive without consulting them, which is usually required if an operator
wants to change a standard.
LXRP contractors were confused about the status of the directive, and
MTIA was concerned that there would be cost implications if in-progress
removals needed to follow it.
In May 2020, DoT established a working group on axle counters to sit
outside the standards governance structure. The working group aims to
respond to MTIA’s concerns about the directive and consider a
network-wide risk assessment.
DoT has recently updated its standards governance framework to address
the gap that allowed the axle counter issue to arise. It now requires Metro
Trains and DoT to consult with agencies on urgent engineering directives
before releasing them.
This example shows that unclear changes are still occurring. However, DoT
is continuing to refine its standards governance process as needed.
Source: VAGO, based on information from DoT and MTIA.
With the introduction of DoT’s network and project governance framework in March
2020, DoT has changed the names and responsibilities of the committees involved in
standards governance. To avoid confusion, DoT needs to update its standards
governance framework to reflect these changes.
Network requirements
While DoT has developed NTS, it advised us that it is still developing higher level
network requirements, including a Victorian Rail Plan that will provide the agreed
architecture for the network’s configuration and service levels. Until that work is
completed, DoT lacks a consolidated understanding of the public transport network’s
technical needs to guide project development and future system-wide improvements.
44 | Follow up of Managing the Level Crossing Removal Program | Victorian Auditor-General´s Report
APPENDIX A
Submissions and comments
We have consulted with DoT and MTIA and we considered their
views when reaching our audit conclusions. As required by the
Audit Act 1994, we gave a draft copy of this report, or relevant
extracts, to those agencies and asked for their submissions and
comments.
Responsibility for the accuracy, fairness and balance of those
comments rests solely with the agency head.
Responses were received as follows:
DoT …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 45
45 | Follow up of Managing the Level Crossing Removal Program | Victorian Auditor-General´s Report
Response provided by the Secretary, DoT
46 | Follow up of Managing the Level Crossing Removal Program | Victorian Auditor-General´s Report
Response provided by the Secretary, DoT—continued
47 | Follow up of Managing the Level Crossing Removal Program | Victorian Auditor-General´s Report
APPENDIX B
Acronyms, abbreviations and
glossary
Acronyms
ALCAM Australian Level Crossing Assessment Model
DEDJTR Department of Economic Development, Jobs, Transport and
Resources
DoT Department of Transport
DTF Department of Treasury and Finance
HVHR High Value High Risk
ILC investment life cycle
JCC Joint Coordination Committee
KPI key performance indicator
LXRA Level Crossing Removal Authority
LXRP Level Crossing Removal Project
LXRP1 Level Crossing Removal Project—Stage 1
LXRP2 Level Crossing Removal Project—Stage 2
MTIA Major Transport Infrastructure Authority
MRPA Metropolitan Roads Project Alliance
NEPA North Eastern Program Alliance
NTS network technical standards
NWPA North Western Program Alliance
OPV Office of Projects Victoria
PTV Public Transport Victoria
SEPA South Eastern Program Alliance
SPA Southern Program Alliance
48 | Follow up of Managing the Level Crossing Removal Program | Victorian Auditor-General´s Report
Acronyms
TfV Transport for Victoria
TOC target outturn cost
VAGO Victorian Auditor-General’s Office
WPA Western Program Alliance
Abbreviations
Metro Trains Metro Trains Melbourne
49 | Follow up of Managing the Level Crossing Removal Program | Victorian Auditor-General´s Report
APPENDIX C
Scope of this audit
Who we audited What we assessed What the audit cost
DoT and MTIA
We assessed if DoT and
MTIA have effectively
The cost of this audit was
$225 000.
addressed the
recommendations from our
2017 audit Managing the
Level Crossings Removal
Program.
Our methods
For this follow-up audit we assessed whether agencies:
 made accurate attestations about implementing our 2017 recommendations
 have taken timely action to address our recommendations
 have plans to address incomplete recommendations
 are monitoring and reviewing the impact of their actions to implement our
recommendations
 made transparent and appropriate decisions in cases where they decided not to
implement recommendations
 have addressed the performance issues we identified, and made
recommendations about, in our 2017 audit.
We conducted our audit in accordance with the Audit Act 1994 and ASAE 3500
Performance Engagements. We complied with the independence and other relevant
ethical requirements related to assurance engagements. We also provided a copy of
the report to the Department of Premier and Cabinet.
Unless otherwise indicated, any persons named in this report are not the subject of
adverse comment or opinion.
50 | Follow up of Managing the Level Crossing Removal Program | Victorian Auditor-General´s Report
FIGURE C1: Our 2017 audit recommendations
Recommendation
number Description
1 DEDJTR follow HVHR guidelines in developing a business case as the basis for government’s investment
decisions, including timing of approval, presenting a range of project options and updating the business
case with any significant changes.
2 DEDJTR, in conjunction with MTIA, develop a transparent selection and prioritisation process for targeted
removal of level crossings beyond current commitments made by government.
3 DEDJTR develop comprehensive KPIs and targets to meaningfully measure achievement of intended
benefits.
4 DEDJTR, in conjunction with MTIA, progressively monitor the progress of achievement of LXRP outcomes
to facilitate timely insight into how the program is progressing towards benefits realisation.
5 DEDJTR, in conjunction with PTV, develop contemporary network rail standards, so that agencies
delivering rail projects have an understanding of network requirements and what is required to assure
projects meet engineering, network integration and safety requirements.
6 DEDJTR, in conjunction with PTV, monitor the effectiveness of PTV’s controls to improve its network
integrity function.
7 MTIA apply options assessments transparently and consistently.
8 MTIA commission an independent evaluation and report on whether the deferred pricing contract
structure is cost-effective and has delivered its intended benefits.
9 MTIA embed its benchmarking tool into the procurement process before using it to award additional
works sites.
10 MTIA, in conjunction with TfV, evaluate its packaging approach and incorporate lessons learned into
future level crossing removals.
Note: See Section 1.3 for changes to responsible agencies.
Source: VAGO.
51 | Follow up of Managing the Level Crossing Removal Program | Victorian Auditor-General´s Report
APPENDIX D
LXRP sites
FIGURE D1: The first 50 level crossing removal sites (LXRP1)
Level crossing location Current status (July 2020)
Abbotts Road, Dandenong South Removed
Aviation Road, Laverton Removed
Balcombe Road, Mentone Removed
Bell Street, Coburg Construction—contract awarded
Bell Street, Preston Removed
Blackburn Road, Blackburn Removed
Buckley Street, Essendon Removed
Burke Road, Glen Iris Removed
Camp Road, Campbellfield Removed
Centre Road, Bentleigh Removed
Centre Road, Clayton Removed
Chandler Road, Noble Park Removed
Charman Road, Cheltenham Construction—contract awarded
Cherry Street, Werribee Construction—contract awarded
Clayton Road, Clayton Removed
Clyde Road, Berwick Construction—contract awarded
Corrigan Road, Noble Park Removed
Edithvale Road, Edithvale Construction—contract awarded
Eel Race Road, Carrum Removed
Ferguson Street, Williamstown In planning
Furlong Road, St Albans Removed
Glenroy Road, Glenroy Construction—pending contract
52 | Follow up of Managing the Level Crossing Removal Program | Victorian Auditor-General´s Report
Level crossing location Current status (July 2020)
Grange Road, Alphington Removed
Grange Road, Carnegie Removed
Hallam Road, Hallam Construction—pending contract
Heatherdale Road, Mitcham Removed
Heatherton Road, Noble Park Removed
High Street, Reservoir Removed
Koornang Road, Carnegie Removed
Kororoit Creek Road, Williamstown North Removed
Lochiel Avenue, Edithvale* Construction—contract awarded
Lower Plenty Road, Rosanna Removed
Main Road, St Albans Removed
Manchester Road, Mooroolbark Construction—contract awarded
Maroondah Highway, Lilydale Construction—contract awarded
Mascot Avenue, Bonbeach* Removed
McKinnon Road, McKinnon Removed
Melton Highway, Sydenham Removed
Moreland Road, Brunswick Construction—contract awarded
Murrumbeena Road, Murrumbeena Removed
Mountain Highway, Bayswater Removed
North Road, Ormond Removed
Park Road, Cheltenham* Removed
Poath Road, Hughesdale Removed
Seaford Road, Seaford Removed
Scoresby Road, Bayswater Removed
Skye/Overton Road, Frankston Removed
Station Street/Bondi Road, Bonbeach Construction—contract awarded
Station Street, Carrum Removed
South Gippsland Highway, Dandenong Construction—contract awarded
Thompsons Road, Lyndhurst Removed
Toorak Road, Kooyong Removed
Werribee Street, Werribee Construction—contract awarded
Note: *Level crossing not included in original list. MTIA added these later for delivery efficiency with LXRP1 sites.
Source: VAGO, based on information from MTIA.
53 | Follow up of Managing the Level Crossing Removal Program | Victorian Auditor-General´s Report
FIGURE D2: LXRP2 level crossing removal sites
Level crossing location Current status (July 2020)
Argyle Avenue, Chelsea Construction—contract awarded
Camms Road, Cranbourne In planning
Cardinia Road, Pakenham Construction—contract awarded
Chelsea Road, Chelsea Construction—contract awarded
Cramer Street, Preston Construction—pending contract
Evans Road, Lyndhurst Construction—contract awarded
Fitzgerald Road, Ardeer In planning
Glen Huntly Road, Glen Huntly In planning
Greens Road, Dandenong South Construction—contract awarded
McGregor Road, Pakenham In planning
Main Street, Pakenham In planning
Mont Albert Road, Mont Albert In planning
Mt Derrimut Road, Deer Park In planning
Munro Street, Coburg Construction—contract awarded
Murray Road, Preston Construction—pending contract
Neerim Road, Glen Huntly In planning
Oakover Road, Preston Construction—contract awarded
Old Geelong Road, Hoppers Crossing Construction—contract awarded
Racecourse Road, Pakenham In planning
Reynard Street, Coburg Construction—contract awarded
Robinsons Road, Deer Park In planning
Station Street/Gap Road, Sunbury In planning
Swanpool Avenue, Chelsea Construction—contract awarded
Union Road, Surrey Hills In planning
Webster Street, Dandenong In planning
Source: VAGO, based on information from MTIA.
54 | Follow up of Managing the Level Crossing Removal Program | Victorian Auditor-General´s Report
APPENDIX E
LXRP benefits management plan
FIGURE E1: Site assessment framework—LXRA benefits and KPIs
Benefits KPI
Benefits
management plan
section Target
1. Improved productivity from more reliable and efficient transport networks
Network efficiency 1 1.1a Travel time 100% of sites will have an improvement in
travel time following removal of level
crossing
1.1b Throughput 100% of sites will have increased
throughput of vehicles following removal
of level crossings
100% of sites will have increased
throughput of cyclists or pedestrians
following removal of level crossings
Reliability of travel
times on the road and
rail network
2 1.2a Travel time
standard deviation
100% of sites with boom gate closures of
more than 25% of the AM peak will have
an improvement to the reliability of travel
time following removal of level crossings
1.2b Train punctuality 100% of sites will have an elimination of
passenger weighted minutes as a result of
signal faults at the level crossing
following removal of level crossings
Public transport
improvements
3 3.1a Percentage of line
grade separated
Percentage of line grade separated as a
result of the LXRP (% based on each site)
1.3b
Public transport
punctuality
100% of sites with road-based public
transport will have improved punctuality
of road-based public transport (for
example, an increase in the number of
services that are on time or not as late)
following removal of level crossings
Economic productivity 4 1.4a Access to labour
markets
100% of national employment clusters
will have improved access to labour
55 | Follow up of Managing the Level Crossing Removal Program | Victorian Auditor-General´s Report
Benefits KPI
Benefits
management plan
section Target
markets following the removal of level
crossings
2. Better connected, liveable and thriving communities
Frequency and
severity of accident
1 2.1a Community
satisfaction
At least 60% of survey respondents at
each site are satisfied with the changes as
a result of the level crossing removal
Infill land
developments around
rail corridors
2 2.2a Integrated
development
opportunities
All sites identified with integrated
development opportunities at the project
proposal stage will achieve an increase in
residential units and/or let-able
retail/business floor space
Access to jobs,
education and services
3 2.3a Access for
employment
100% of sites will improve access to jobs,
education, and services
2.3b
Access for local
activity centres
100% of sites will have improved access
to local activity centres and major services
Public transport
intermodal
connectivity
4 2.4a Drop-off time and
distance
100% of sites have reduced distance
and/or travel time between collection and
drop-off points
3. Safer communities
Frequency and
severity of accidents
1 3.1a Number of
incidents
100% of sites have zero crashes and near
miss incidents involving trains as a result
of the level crossing removal and no
negative safety outcomes as a result of
the level crossing removal works
Exposure to risk 2 3.2a Improved ALCAM 100% of sites have an ALCAM risk score
of zero
Source: VAGO, based on information from MTIA.
56 | Follow up of Managing the Level Crossing Removal Program | Victorian Auditor-General´s Report
APPENDIX F
LXRP works packages
FIGURE F1: LXRP1 works packages
Works/program alliance package Level crossing removal site
Package 1 Burke Road, Glen Iris
Centre Road, Bentleigh
McKinnon Road, McKinnon
North Road, Ormond
Package 2 Blackburn Road, Blackburn
Furlong Road, St Albans
Heatherdale Road, Mitcham
Main Road, St Albans
Package 3 Chandler Road, Noble Park
Clayton Road, Clayton
Centre Road, Clayton
Corrigan Road, Noble Park
Grange Road, Carnegie
Heatherton Road, Noble Park
Koornang Road, Carnegie
Murrumbeena Road, Murrumbeena
Poath Road, Hughesdale
Package 4 Mountain Highway, Bayswater
Scoresby Road, Bayswater
Individually packaged sites Melton Highway, Sydenham
Thompsons Road, Lyndhurst
North Eastern Program Alliance (NEPA) Bell Street, Preston
57 | Follow up of Managing the Level Crossing Removal Program | Victorian Auditor-General´s Report
Works/program alliance package Level crossing removal site
Clyde Road, Berwick**
High Street, Reservoir
Grange Road, Alphington
Hallam Road, Hallam*
Lower Plenty Road, Rosanna
Manchester Road, Mooroolbark*
Maroondah Highway, Lilydale*
South Gippsland Highway, Dandenong**
Toorak Road, Kooyong*
North Western Program Alliance (NWPA) Bell Street, Coburg
Buckley Street, Essendon
Camp Road, Campbellfield
Glenroy Road, Glenroy
Moreland Road, Brunswick
Skye/Overton Road, Frankston
Southern Program Alliance (SPA) Balcombe Road, Mentone
Charman Road, Cheltenham
Eel Race Road, Carrum
Edithvale Road, Edithvale
Mascot Avenue, Bonbeach
Park Road, Cheltenham
Seaford Road, Seaford
Station Street/Bondi Road, Bonbeach
Station Street, Carrum
Western Program Alliance (WPA) Abbotts Road, Dandenong South
Aviation Road, Laverton
Cherry Street, Werribee
Ferguson Street, Williamstown
Kororoit Creek Road, Williamstown
Werribee Street, Werribee
Note: Packages 1 to 4 preceded the program alliance framework.
Note: *sites allocated to NEPA rail.
Note: **sites allocated to NEPA road.
Source: VAGO, based on information from MTIA.
58 | Follow up of Managing the Level Crossing Removal Program | Victorian Auditor-General´s Report
FIGURE F2: LXRP2 program alliances
Program alliance Level crossing removal site
Southern Program Alliance (SPA) Argyle Avenue, Chelsea
Chelsea Road, Chelsea
Swanpool Avenue, Chelsea
Glen Huntly Road, Glen Huntly
Neerim Road, Glen Huntly
South Eastern Program Alliance
(previously NEPA rail)
Mont Albert Road, Mont Albert
Union Road, Surrey Hills
Metropolitan Roads Project Alliance
(previously NEPA road)
Camms Road, Cranbourne
Cardinia Road Pakenham
Evans Road, Lyndhurst
Fitzgerald Road, Ardeer
Robinsons Road, Deer Park
North Western Program Alliance (NWPA) Cramer Street, Preston
McGregor Road, Pakenham
Main Street, Pakenham
Munro Street, Coburg
Murray Street, Preston
Oakover Road, Preston
Racecourse Road, Pakenham
Reynard Street, Coburg
Western Program Alliance (WPA) Greens Road, Dandenong South*
Mount Derrimut Road, Deer Park
Old Geelong Road, Hoppers Crossing
Station Street/Gap Road, Sunbury**
Webster Street, Dandenong
Note: *Greens Road is now allocated to the Cranbourne Line Duplication’s program alliance.
Note: **Station Street is now allocated to the Rail Infrastructure Alliance program alliance.
Source: VAGO, based on information from MTIA.
59 | Follow up of Managing the Level Crossing Removal Program | Victorian Auditor-General´s Report
Auditor-General’s reports
tabled during 2020–21
Report title Date
Rehabilitating Mines (2020–21: 1) August 2020
Management of the Student Resource Package (2020–21: 2) August 2020
Victoria’s Homelessness Response (2020–21: 3) September 2020
Reducing Bushfire Risks (2020–21: 4) October 2020
Follow up of Managing the Level Crossing Removal Program
(2020–21: 5)
October 2020
All reports are available for download in PDF and HTML format on our website
www.audit.vic.gov.au
Victorian Auditor-General’s Office
Level 31, 35 Collins Street
Melbourne Vic 3000
AUSTRALIA
Phone +61 3 8601 7000
Email enquiries@audit.vic.gov.au

READ ALSO...   Computer system
Order from Academic Writers Bay
Best Custom Essay Writing Services

QUALITY: 100% ORIGINAL PAPERNO PLAGIARISM – CUSTOM PAPER